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Abstract: The design of electricity markets determines the technologies, services and modes of op-
eration that can access value, consequently shaping current and future electricity landscapes. This 
paper highlights that the efficacy of Great Britain’s electricity market design in facilitating net zero 
is inadequate and must be reconfigured. The rules of the current electricity market design are rem-
nants of an electricity sector dominated by large-scale, centralised, fossil fuel technologies. There-
fore, routes to market for the provision of necessary services to support net zero, not least flexibility, 
are largely inaccessible for distributed energy resources and, despite their benefits to the system, 
are thus undervalued. Based upon a review and consolidation of 30 proposed electricity market 
designs from liberalised electricity sectors, this paper proposes a new electricity market design for 
Great Britain. This design is presented alongside a new institutional framework to aid in the efficient 
operation of the market. Specifically, this paper proposes a new local balancing and coordinating 
market located at each grid supply point (the transmission and distribution interface). This is real-
ised through the implementation of a distributed locational marginal pricing structure which is 
governed by the evolution of the current distributed network operator, known as the distributed 
service provider (DSP). The DSP also operates a local balancing and ancillary market for their geo-
graphical area. The wholesale market is reconfigured to coordinate with these new local markets 
and to harmonise the actors across the distribution and transmission network. 
Keywords: distribution gap; smart energy system; COVID-19; distributed locational marginal price; 
decentralised electricity system 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the turn of the century, the electricity sectors of many industrialised nations, 
including Great Britain (GB), have undergone fundamental political and technological 
paradigm shifts. This is realised through the combination of policy directives in response 
to anthropogenic climate change and the subsequent technological innovations leading to 
the displacement of conventional generating units [1–4]. 
The hierarchy of the electricity sector has shifted from a predominantly centralised, 
top-down and linear model to one where centralised and distributed technologies coexist 
[5–8]. In parallel to the deployment of distributed energy resources (DER) such as small-
scale solar and onshore wind, the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) is unlocking 
flexible capacity from the once passive demand side [7,9,10], permitting trades of electric-
ity and ancillary services at the local level [7,11]. 
As well as requiring new modes of electricity system operation, this also enhances 
the value of decentralised technologies, which—in a departure from traditional load-fol-
lowing principles—can increasingly receive financial compensation for the services that 
they provide to the system. 
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To access the opportunities arising from an increasingly decentralised electricity sys-
tem, such as unlocking and utilising local flexibility to solve grid issues [12,13], using this 
flexibility to defer costly network reinforcement [14–18] and reducing balancing costs by 
locating generation close to demand [9,19–21], appropriate institutional governance is re-
quired [22–24]. Governance for net zero necessitates multiple changes to institutional 
frameworks, from placing new duties on current regulators and devolving energy gov-
ernance to local levels, to the reconfiguration of the electricity market design [22,24–26]. 
This paper focuses on the latter. Market design influences electricity transition pathways 
by determining which technologies and services can provide firms with revenue streams. 
The rules which govern participation within electricity markets, the market design, are 
important as they determine market winners and losers by defining the value of services 
(e.g., of power and flexibility) and the technologies which could provide them [24,27–31]. 
Those technologies deemed eligible to participate within a specific market and ex-
tract value from the provision of a service, whether generation asset or demand-side as-
sets, will be seen as favourable investments compared to those with no viable route to the 
market even if that technology offers value to the overall system in the context of net zero 
[32–34]. To date, the electricity system has relied upon large-scale, centralised forms of 
generating assets such as coal and combined cycle gas turbines plants. As these generating 
assets were prominent at the time of privatisation and the subsequent New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA), the electricity market design was based upon their char-
acteristics [35,36]. 
The legacy of a centralised market design has resulted in a ‘distribution gap’, a void 
in the institutional framework at the distribution level, as evidenced by the lack of routes 
to market for embedded technologies, which are often serviced in the retail market instead 
[33,37,38]. As it stands, the economics of electricity generation are skewed towards cen-
tralised technologies, and electricity markets therefore need to be re-designed to both un-
lock investment in DER as well as the adoption of associated business models [11,39]. 
This paper provides a conceptual framework for a new electricity market design 
which advocates the introduction of a balancing and coordinating market located at each 
of the grid supply points (GSP), the physical interface between the distribution and trans-
mission network, located at 132 kV in England. 
This is realised through a pay-as-clear pool market, a balancing and ancillary market 
at each of the GSPs which is governed by the evolution of the current distribution network 
operator (DNO), known as the distributed service provider (DSP) [22]. These ‘local’ mar-
kets bring forward regional differences to indicate to investors where on the network a 
specific technology and services would be valued. These are not to be confused with local 
energy markets (LEMs) which are private platforms operated by third parties such as Cen-
trica [33]. The national wholesale market is also reconfigured to increase investment cer-
tainty to both variable and flexible technologies located on both the distribution and trans-
mission network through amendments to regulation and trading arrangements. The elec-
tricity market design operates over a broad timescale, from years in advance up to the 
delivery of the traded electron. The timescale of focus for this proposed design is that of 
the SPOT, i.e., 48 h up to, and including, the delivery of the contracted service. This paper 
also proposes reconfigurations to the balancing and ancillary markets within this time-
scale. The rationale for focusing on this timeframe is underpinned by the importance of 
operating closer to real time for variable renewable energy (VRE) generating assets, as this 
permits more accurate forecasting and allows one to re-position themselves to mitigate 
imbalance charges [40,41]. The importance of the Day Ahead (DAH) and Intraday (ID) 
market will continue as trading closer to delivery will become increasingly critical [41].  
The proposed re-configuration of GB’s electricity market design in this paper builds 
upon and consolidates 30 proposed electricity market designs within liberalised electricity 
sectors to create a strawman design. Building on similar approaches taken elsewhere 
[11,42], this design was reviewed and critiqued by academics, governmental representa-
tives and industry experts to appraise, refine and validate the proposal.  
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The proposed design was guided by a smart energy system (SES) approach which 
coordinates across the three pillars of energy (electricity, mobility and heat) to identify 
synergies between these in order to provide an optimal solution to both the individual 
sector, and the overall energy system [43,44]. As such, multiple alterations to the electricity 
market design are proposed which facilitate the integration of services, i.e., flexibility, 
from both the heat and mobility sector [6,43–46]. Therefore, the proposed design promotes 
the belief that a provider of a service should be able to access the market based upon the 
provision of said service, not basing market access on the characteristics of the underlying 
technology. This means that the proposed electricity market design fits within the wider 
institutional governance of the energy sector change by harmonising across the electricity, 
heat and mobility sectors—in other words, it is one dimension of a whole-system solution 
for energy transformation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature to justify the need for 
a reconfiguration of GB’s electricity market design. Section 3 introduces the methodology 
used within this study. Section 4 details the proposed electricity market design, and Sec-
tion 5 provides concluding remarks and proposed areas for further studies. 
2. Literature Review  
The objective of this literature review is to evidence that the efficacy of GB’s electricity 
market design has diminished and necessitates a reconfiguration. This argument is based 
upon the following segments. Firstly, the objectives of the electricity market design intro-
duced at the time of privatisation, whilst still paramount, must be underpinned through 
means which also aid in the facilitation of net zero. Secondly, in terms of the issues, but 
also the benefits, stemming from the deployment of distributed technologies with new 
modes of operation unlocked via digitalisation, the former can be resolved, whilst the lat-
ter can be exploited through re-design. Thirdly, the skewed economics of the electricity 
sector, known as the distribution gap, which can be evidenced by events brought forward 
by COVID-19, will be explored.  
2.1. Market Objectives and Market Design Implementation 
The liberalisation of Britain’s electricity supply industry in 1990 signified a transition 
away from public ownership of the Central Electricity Generation Board—a move away 
from a monopoly to a private market driven system [47,48]. The objectives of the intro-
duced market design were to deliver secure, reliable electricity efficiently and at compet-
itive prices [47,49]. The means of achieving these objectives would ideally be met by tech-
nologies and services which align with net zero. As will be evidenced in the following 
section, the technologies and services exist but the market design must be reconfigured to 
exploit these [26,50–52]. 
The rules underpinning the electricity market design evolve in a continuous process 
in which stakeholders may play an important role [52], assuming their collected and con-
solidated views are used to aid and inform those with the agency to enact the eventual 
market design re-configuration. A recent example is the Council of Australian Govern-
ments [53] in Australia which called for feedback from interested parties on possible so-
lutions to the falling efficacy of their electricity market design. The value of this paper is 
the consolidation of expert views on how the future electricity market design should be 
structured, the outcome of which is detailed in Section 4. This is not a quantitative analysis 
of the proposed design, though mathematical modelling would add to the validity. 
2.2. Technological Developments Have Led to Concerns over the Efficacy of the Electricity 
Market Design 
The deployment of variable, zero-carbon technologies onto both transmission and 
distribution networks has been supported by both national and EU policies to encourage 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Policies such as the Renewables Obligation, the 
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feed in tariff, and the Contract for Difference (CfD) have brought forward learning gains 
with the increased levels of deployment resulting in greater technical and construction 
experience. This in turn has decreased operational costs and increased the efficiency of 
these generating assets [2,54].  
Between 2010 and 2019, the share of renewable generation in total electricity genera-
tion in the UK increased fourfold, and in 2019 renewables contributed 37.1% of total elec-
tricity generation—the first time these generators have provided over one-third of total 
electricity generation [55]. During the same time period, the share of fossil fuels decreased 
by 51%, with many conventional generators losing their market share to VRE generating 
assets [55]. This trend is likely to continue, with National Grid ESO’s 2020 Future Energy 
Scenarios (FES) estimating that by 2030, up to 71% of total electricity generation within 
GB is expected to be at zero-marginal cost, rising to 80% by 2050 [6]. This FES also esti-
mates that by 2050, 42% of generating assets will be connected to the distribution network 
[6,56]. This trend has brought forward many issues but also many benefits which can be 
exploited as reviewed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively.  
2.2.1. Issues  
There are multiple issues stemming from this technological shift, and more broadly 
from operating a bilaterally based market structure (Table 1). These are likely to become 
exacerbated with the further deployment of zero-marginal cost generation and DER. 
These issues are revisited in Section 4, Table 5, which explains how the proposed design 
can aid to mitigate these issues.
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Table 1. Summary of several issues associated with the current electricity market design. 
Issue Summary 
Missing money 
The dispatch of generating assets is determined by their Operational Expenditure (OPEX) cost, principally the fuel element [2]. As more effi-
cient thermal assets enter the market with lower OPEX costs, the older units are displaced. This phenomenon is exacerbated by variable gener-
ating assets with low OPEX cost due to the removal of the fuel element, displacing the more expensive technologies [42,57,58]. This results in a 
lower capture rate for those still required to meet demand, decreasing the incentive to invest in technologies reliant upon a sustained clearing 
price, leading to concerns over long-term capacity adequacy [21,59,60]. 
Price cannibalisation 
High VRE output can displace thermal generators with higher OPEX costs, lowering the clearing price and reducing the VRE capture rate [61–
63]. This increases the risk for those operating in the market without a form of revenue assurance scheme such as the CfD [57,61]. 
Lacking flexibility 
Despite agreement on the requirement for flexibility by governmental bodies, economic regulators, system operators, academics and industry 
bodies, to date, only the balancing and ancillary market provide value for flexibility as a service [64,65]. Furthermore, neither the CfD nor the 
capacity market were designed for the procurement of flexible services. The CfD addressed long-term investment into low-carbon generation, 
whereas the capacity market was designed to only respond to the system adequacy challenge and not the emergent flexibility adequacy chal-
lenge [56,63,64,66]. Additionally, in securing system adequacy, the capacity market has reduced the prevalence of scarcity events in which 
prices would rise as the margins between supply and demand converge, raising the market clearing price [67]. These events provide the signal 
for possible revenue stream for flexibility from demand-side assets as they can reduce one’s demand during these high-priced events, or gen-
erate an income based on the arbitrage opportunities [31]. 
Lacking 
transparency 
An estimated 85% of GB electricity is traded bilaterally in which the volumes and prices are not within the public domain, only accessible 
through a subscription to a price reporting agency [68–70]. This opaque structure dampens investment signals as the financial compensation 




The increased deployment of DER evidences the need to reflect regional geographies within the electricity market design. However, GB oper-
ates under a single price bidding zone, with price formation at the national level [72]. This does not reflect local characteristics such as the 
scarcity or surplus of electricity within a constrained area of the network [20,73]. Reflecting ‘local’ network conditions would signal where on 
the network value could be realised by providing a specific service, i.e., flexibility. Solving locational issues with either generating or demand-
side assets or services in close proximity via a local market would support their integration, helping to conserve the profits from these services 
in the local economy, which may also encourage new investment into DER [12,13]. 
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2.2.2. Potential Benefits to Be Exploited through Electricity Market Design Re-Configura-
tion  
Facilitating net zero is considered to be underpinned by zero-carbon, variable and 
often distributed technologies such as onshore wind [6,8,65,74,75]. As such, the electricity 
market design would ideally evidence the investment potential in technologies and ser-
vices which provide flexibility to counteract variability [76] alongside DER to unlock the 
following benefits: 
(1) Reducing balancing costs through the displacement of more expensive, and carbon-
intensive forms of flexibility such as an open-cycle gas turbine [77]. 
(2) Network operators, through schemes such as active network management, can defer 
costly network reinforcements by utilising consumer flexibility to minimise the 
breaching of network operational limits [14–18]. 
a. Furthermore, these relatively small investments into flexible demand-side assets 
can postpone decisions on larger investment until more evidence is collected, 
reducing the scope for making potentially high regret decisions [77–79]. 
(3) Locating flexible services near to, or co-locating with, VRE generation can mitigate 
the extent of price cannibalisation by absorbing excess VRE and reinjecting at times 
of increased demand. This reinjection will likely coincide with higher power prices, 
resulting in a more profitable capture rate [80]. 
a. This has an added benefit of reducing network constraints via the removal of 
the excess electrons on the network. By storing, and not curtailing this zero-car-
bon generation, when reinjected this removes the need for carbon-intensive 
technologies which may have been otherwise required [80]. 
(4) Regional geographies will become increasingly important under a decentralised elec-
tricity system. Local balancing can be facilitated through the deployment of genera-
tion and demand in proximity on the network. This removes the distance that elec-
trons would otherwise travel and possibly breach network capacity in doing so, thus 
leading to a more efficient use of the network [9,20,21,45,78,81]. 
These benefits can be realised through the deployment of locational market [7,45]. 
2.3. The Distribution Gap  
The legacy of an electricity market design based upon the then present characteristics 
of centralised, large-scale and top-down operation has led to a distribution gap [22,33]. 
The distribution gap refers to the void of institutional framework at the distribution net-
work, as this level was often considered ‘passive’ and only ‘drew’ from the transmission 
level where the majority of centralised generating assets were located [8]. However, as 
evidenced by Section 2.2, the electricity landscape is undergoing a fundamental shift, with 
electricity generated from within a GSP increasingly being exported onto the transmission 
network [82]. Yet, the legacy of operating a centralised electricity market design has 
skewed the economics of the electricity sector, limiting the value for services which DER 
can provide. This can be evidenced by recent events brought forward under COVID-19.  
2.3.1. COVID-19 
Both international and domestic imposed lockdowns in response to COVID-19 led to 
dramatic shifts in electricity consumption patterns [83–87]. All European countries expe-
rienced a significant overall decline in demand for electricity due to population contain-
ment measures except Sweden, which imposed ‘soft’ confinement measures [85]. Overall 
demand in Sweden remained consistent with pre-COVID-19 levels, which has been at-
tributed to demand from certain sectors of the economy decreasing, such as transporta-
tion, being offset by increases in residential buildings [88]. 
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In GB, actual electricity demand was ~20% less than National Grid ESO’s predictions, 
whilst Q2 2020 saw a +32% increase in the share of renewables compared to Q2 of 2019 
[89,90]. The higher renewable output led to major challenges in absorbing this variable 
generation, leading to the increased cost of balancing actions and the continued dampen-
ing of the wholesale power price [91,92]. These trends were expected by 2030, yet condi-
tions brought forward by measures in response to COVID-19 during the summer of 2020 
provide a glimpse into the future electricity sector [91]. As such, the actions taken this 
summer provide insights into inefficiencies within GB’s current electricity market design 
under a scenario akin to net zero. 
The distribution gap can be evidenced by two events over the summer months of 
2020. First, National Grid ESO raised modification GC0143: Last Resort Disconnection of 
Embedded Generation in response to the decrease in demand. Their rationale for the de-
cision was based on forecasts that only generation from non-flexible units such as nuclear 
and embedded generators would limit the ESO’s ability to maintain the security of supply 
[93]. This modification permitted the ESO to instruct a DNO to disconnect embedded gen-
eration without financial compensation [86,93]. 
As embedded generators have not historically been utilised by National Grid ESO to 
balance the grid, they therefore do not have a connection agreement with them, and can’t 
be activated and financially compensated by National Grid ESO, unlike their transmis-
sion-connected counterparties [93]. Therefore, in the scenario of being disconnected under 
GC0143, they would not receive financial payment despite their service providing a value 
to the network. As such, this poses financial risk to embedded generators which their 
transmission-connected parties would not be exposed to, demonstrating the skewed na-
ture of the electricity economics against DER.  
Whilst GC0143 demonstrates the distribution gap, the introduction of Operation 
Downward Frequency Management (ODFM), a temporary service between May and Oc-
tober 2020, highlighted the significant role of distributed generating and demand-side as-
sets in offering flexibility to balancing the grid. Between May and October 2020, GC0143 
had not been issued as National Grid ESO designed and implemented ODFM [94]. This 
temporary service allows National Grid ESO to contract with technologies outside of the 
balancing market, typically embedded generation, previously invisible to National Grid 
ESO due to the lack of contractual agreement [94]. Over 4.5 GW of predominantly embed-
ded solar and onshore wind has signed up to this service with just under 5 GW of ODFM 
being utilised in May 2020 alone [94,95]. ODFM evidences how distributed connected VRE 
generating assets can contribute to balancing services and receive financial compensation 
for providing their flexibility. This temporary route to market indicated that it is possible 
to realign the electricity economics to a level playing field. 
The current electricity economics has to date aided the lock in of thermal generators 
as these generating assets are remunerated, justifying future investment which is not the 
case for their distributed counterparties [27,96]. However, this does not need to be the 
case. The electricity market design is a social construct and therefore this institution can, 
and has been, reconfigured in response to concerns over the efficacy of the current design 
as demonstrated by the introduction of ODFM [97]. 
2.3.2. Pursuing a Smart Energy System Approach 
The electrification of both the heat and mobility sector through the deployment of 
demand-side assets, such as heat pumps and electric vehicles (EVs), provide additional 
forms of flexibility to be exploited if the market design permitted [43,44]. In utilising em-
bedded demand-side assets for their flexibility, ODFM (and indeed many other trials such 
as WPD’s Electric Nation [98], Oxfordshire’s project LEO [99] and those awarded Innovate 
UK funding for Vehicle to Grid services [100]) demonstrate the novel means of providing 
additional flexibility to the network [6]. The application of these demand-side assets 
demonstrates the value in ‘plugging’ this distribution gap and they are making strides 
towards doing so.  
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This practice is referred to as a smart energy system (SES) approach within the liter-
ature, which offers access to increased flexibility and storage capacity which are vital for 
the integration of VRE at scale [6,43–46]. The SES approach, which utilises both mobility 
and heat as flexible load, may provide cheaper alternatives than an electrical counterpart 
[44,101]. Therefore, there are clear associated benefits of a SES approach but in order to 
facilitate the deployment of these flexible demand-side assets, there needs to be a clear 
route to market which identifies the value for their services [43,44,101]. 
Despite the aforementioned importance of pursuing a SES approach, the current elec-
tricity market design hinders the ability to do so. For example, National Grid ESO, in their 
2020 FES, forecast 38.5 GW of vehicle to grid flexibility by 2050 [6], which is required to 
underpin a high renewable future, but facilitating this will require alterations to the exist-
ing market design. This has been recognised within National Grid ESO’s ‘wider access to 
the balancing market’ campaign, which has eased the access of flexibility providers into 
the balancing market through the design and implementation of the virtual power plant 
[102]. This permits aggregators of EV load to enter into the balancing market, as is being 
pioneered by Flexitricity [103]. However, virtual power plant status does not permit ac-
cess into the wholesale market, limiting sources of additional income. Furthermore, EVs 
are not permitted to compete for capacity payments under the current capacity market 
regime as they are not recognised as a ‘generating technology class’ [104]. In securing an 
additional revenue scheme through the capacity market, this would increase the invest-
ment opportunities into EVs, yet this is not currently permitted, reducing the attractive-
ness for possible investors. While progress is being made within the mobility sector, the 
utilisation of flexibility from heating is still in its infancy [46,101]. Therefore, as will be 
detailed in Section 4, the local balancing and coordinating markets reduce the barriers to 
market entry for smaller-scale technologies which will likely be the EVs and those with 
heat load in order to provide an more suitable route to market and a means to provide 
their flexibility.  
Though future reference to the ‘electricity market design’ will be made, this is with 
the inclusion of the mobility and heat sectors alongside other electricity intensive indus-
tries which can provide grid services. 
3. Methodology  
This section details the methodology employed within this research, which led to the 
creation of an industry appraised electricity market design proposed in Section 4.  
A systems thinking approach guided this research. Systems thinking takes as a start-
ing point that systems are greater than the sum of their parts, and emphasises the im-
portance of studying the dynamic interconnections between system components and the 
resultant ‘emergent’ behaviours of systems [105–107]. 
The relevance of incorporating a systems thinking approach within this study was 
twofold. Firstly, the electricity market design is conceptualised as a set of interconnected 
modules, each with their own function but when brought together constitute the electric-
ity market design, i.e., the system is greater than the sum of its parts (See Section 3.2 for 
more details). Secondly, and as will be discussed in Section 4.7, with the shift from a pre-
dominantly centralised, top-down electricity system to one where both centralised and 
decentralised technologies are to coexist, facilitating the coordination between actors 
across the network will be critical to the efficient operation of the electricity market design. 
The need for coordination between system components is recognised within the systems 
thinking approach. Furthermore, this approach has been implemented in three previous 
publications on alternative electricity market designs [42,106,108], indicating the rele-
vance of systems thinking within this field of study.  
This methodology consisted of 4 stages. 
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3.1. Stage 1: Review of Previously Proposed Market Designs 
The authors identified 30 proposed electricity market designs published since the 
turn of the century for liberalised electricity systems across the globe, sourced from a 
range of grey and academic literature(s). Each reviewed proposal had an issue statement 
which guided their solution through re-design, i.e., [109] proposed a local flexibility mar-
ket as a means to procure flexibility to mitigate costly network reinforcements. When ap-
propriate, these solutions were incorporated into the proposed design following the se-
lection criteria detailed in Section 3.3. 
3.2. Stage 2: Modularisation of GB’s Electricity Market Design 
Electricity market designs can be understood as a set of interconnected modules 
which individually serve a specific purpose, yet these modules when brought together 
constitute to the electricity market design. For example, the balancing market module is 
to ensure that generation and demand are consistently equal. However, the actions re-
quired by this module relate to the outcome of the wholesale electricity market module in 
determining the scale of balancing actions which will be required. As such, it is not just 
the individual modules which are important but the coordination between them. 
In order to analyse the efficacy of the market design, the technique of ‘modularisa-
tion’ was employed [110,111]. This entails the identification and separation of the core 
components, known as modules, of the system in question. This process provides three 
key insights [110,111]. Firstly, separating a system into modules allows for the evaluation 
of the efficacy of each module in isolation. Secondly, this allows the coordination between 
each of these modules to be reviewed. Thirdly, in reviewing the two aforementioned in-
sights, it provides an overview of the efficacy of the overall system. 
Modularisation has been utilised in previous research to identify perceived issues 
with specific modules, and the coordination between them, enabling the authors to pro-
pose bespoke solutions. Franco et al. [112] utilised this approach to explore the different 
modules introduced during the Electricity Market Reform in GB, whereas Peng and 
Poudineh [42] and Roques and Finnon [21] identified and addressed inconsistencies be-
tween the existing modules of an electricity market design and those newly introduced. 
Their rational for a modular approach stems from the ability to provide a holistic over-
view of the electricity market design, whilst evaluating each module in isolation, so as to 
not leave any assumptions on neglected modules and assess the join performance of all 
modules together. 
3.3. Stage 3: Construction of a Strawman Design 
Identified issues were attributed to specific module(s), the coordination link between 
these, or highlighted where a new function was required, resulting in the introduction of 
a new module. The current modules of GB’s electricity market design were then reconfig-
ured by incorporating many of the proposed solutions reviewed in Section 3.1. 
In reconfiguring the electricity market design, the authors altered the existing mod-
ule(s) through one of the three following processes: 
(1) Augmentation: Introducing a new module to an existing system which embodies 
new concepts, addressing a specific need currently not catered for. 
(2) Layering: The process of new rules being attached to an existing module, to provide 
an additional function.  
(3) Exclusion: Removing a module which is no longer required.  
Table 3 details which process was applied to each module.  
The selection process for whether proposed solutions identified in Section 3.1 were 
to be incorporated was determined by whether the proposed solution: 
(1)  Rectified an issue in line with the objectives of this design, 
(2)  Had any knock-on impacts on fellow modules or the coordination between them, 
and  
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(3)  Could be implemented alongside other proposed solutions. 
a. This created the strawman design which then underwent evaluation (Section 
3.4). 
3.4. Stage 4: Appraisal and the Validation of the Strawman Design  
The strawman design was appraised by industry experts via 35 semi-structured in-
terviews with a range of stakeholders from both GB and Denmark (Table 2).  
Interviewees from Denmark were selected for two main reasons. Firstly, they were 
selected due to their pioneering research on the SES approach [43,44], which provided 
useful insights into how this could be applied to the proposed market design in Section 4. 
Furthermore, Denmark is considered a ‘world leader’ in the transition towards an econ-
omy underpinned by VRE [113,114]. Therefore, the lessons learnt throughout their pio-
neering transition provided insights on the requirements of a future electricity market de-
sign which were incorporated into the proposal.  
However, the two countries operate different electricity market designs. For exam-
ple, GB operates under a national pricing system with a single price for electricity, 
whereas there are two pricing zones in Denmark, with the price of electricity differing 
dependent upon congestion between these zones [67,115]. Whilst these differences limit 
the scope for a direct comparison between the two market designs, the proposed design 
in Section 4 attempts to identify regional differences in the price of electricity. Due to the 
zonal model of Denmark, there were useful insights from interviewees in terms of how to 
shape the market design to emphasise these regional differences. 
These experts were selected based upon their involvement within the electricity mar-
ket. For example, academics had published on the electricity market design, consultants 
had produced working papers on this topic, and energy suppliers were actively involved 
within the markets. 
The proposed strawman design, the outcome of Stage 3, was appraised by 35 indus-
try experts in semi-structured interviews. Interviews centred on discussion of the pro-
posed design and provided opportunities for interviewees to identify aspects of the de-
sign requiring further alteration. Follow-up interviews were held to confirm subsequent 
alterations to the proposed strawman design. 
Furthermore, respondent validation was employed to ensure that the views of the 
interviewees collected were accurate [116]. Interviews were recorded and verbatim tran-
scripts were provided to the interviewee before any element was incorporated. This pro-
cess allowed each interviewee the opportunity to provide feedback on the transcript, en-
suring their views were accurately captured and where necessary, make amendments. 
This provided a breadth of views on the proposed electricity market design detailed 
in the following section, including the feasibility of the proposed design alongside how 
the proposal, in their expert view, would perform against the objectives. 
Table 2. Interviewee shareholder groups. 
Representative 
Academics 9 LEM representatives 2 
Consultants 3 Trade associations 2 
Incumbent energy supplier 3 Transmission system operator 
(TSO) 
1 
Think tank 3 Distributed system operator (DSO) 1 
BSC implementor 2 European energy regulator 1 
Energy economic regulator 2 SME energy supplier 1 
Electricity traders 2 DER installer and optimiser 1 
Government representatives 2   
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Transcripts from the semi-structured interviews were coded to identify the inter-
viewee views on each of the proposed modules, the coordination between them and the 
efficacy of the overall electricity market design. If a respondent viewed an alteration to be 
insufficient, further discussions were held to firstly understand their rationale and sec-
ondly to identify a possible solution. 
4. The Market Design 
This section introduces and discusses the proposed electricity market design for GB. 
4.1. Objectives  
As explained in Section 2.1, emphases on efficient delivery of secure, reliable electric-
ity at competitive pricing can be understood in the context of market liberalisation. How-
ever, the facilitation of net zero requires the reappraisal of the market design in how these 
objectives are achieved [50–52]. Achieving net zero would ideally be met in an equitable 
manner, with all market participants connected to either the distribution or transmission 
network being able to offer in their services and be rewarded for doing so. As evidenced 
by Section 2.3, this is currently not the case.  
This section proposes a set of market design reconfigurations to aid in facilitating 
these objectives in line with net zero.  
4.2. Overview of the Design 
The proposed electricity market design consists of six interrelated modules as illus-
trated in Figure 1: 
• Module 1: The DSP pool market, 
• Module 2: The DSP ancillary market, 
• Module 3: The DSP balancing market, 
• Module 4: The wholesale market, 
• Module 5: The independent integrated system operator (IISO) ancillary market, and 
• Module 6: The IISO balancing market. 
Each of these modules operate in parallel, with actions taken within one module im-
pacting upon another. It is therefore essential that there are clear, established routes for 
coordination between modules to avoid conflicting actions being taken. The following 
section will delve into the purpose of each of these modules independently, before detail-
ing how these modules shall be coordinated in Section 4.7. 
Specifics on each module are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3. Each module, how they were reconfigured and the specifics of the module. Authors’ own. 
Module Re-Configuration Specifics 
The DSP pool market Augmented 
Procurement method: Auction 
Timescale of procurement: DAH/ID 
Clip size: 0.05 Mw 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
The DSP ancillary 
market 
Augmented 
Procurement method: Auction 
Timescale of procurement: DAH/ID 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
Clip size: Product specific. No higher than 0.1 
MW 
The DSP balancing 
market 
Augmented 
Procurement method: Utilising bids/offers 
Timescale of procurement: 5 min window be-
fore the opening of the IISO balancing market 
(Module 6) 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
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Clip size: 0.05 Mw 
The wholesale market Layered 
Procurement method: Auctions 
Timescale of procurement: DAH/ID 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
Clip size: 0.1 MW 
The IISO ancillary 
market Layered 
Procurement method: Auctions 
Timescale of procurement: DAM/ID 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
Clip size: Product specific. No higher than 0.1 
MW 
The IISO balancing 
market Layered 
Procurement method: Utilising bids/offers 
Timescale of procurement: Real time 
Settlement: Pay as clear 
Clip size: 0.1 Mw 
The capacity market Excluded Rationale for exclusion discussed in Section 4.8. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the proposed electricity market design with potential trade routes, value from the GSP into the DSP 
and wholesale market identified. Only one GSP for illustrative clarity. In reality, there would be multiple GSPs within a 
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DSP’s geographical remit. Entities listed within a GSP are not an exhaustive list, but a representation of several likely 
parties to be operational within this geographical area. Tx and Dx refer to transmission network and distribution network, 
respectively. Market participants refer to generating or demand-side asset(s), such as prosumers, EVs and those with flex-
ible electrified heat load. Authors’ own. 
4.3. The Electricity Market Design 
4.3.1. Regulatory Changes 
Regulation is not an explicit aspect of the electricity market design, though their de-
sign impacts upon investor confidence and influence the behaviour of those who own and 
operate within the market [117,118]. Priority dispatch for VRE, and alterations network 
charges are introduced to provide investment confidence whilst financially encouraging 
close proximity between market participants and intended load.  
Priority Dispatch for VRE 
Priority dispatch, the obligation for the TSO to dispatch VRE before their thermal 
counterparties is placed on the TSO, known henceforth as the independent integrated sys-
tem operator (IISO), DSPs and the wholesale market manager. This is to facilitate the two 
market tiers alongside utilising zero-carbon technologies for ancillary and balancing ser-
vices where feasible. Though VRE will typically be dispatched first due to their near zero 
marginal costs, priority dispatch provides further reassurances to investors that their VRE 
generating assets will be utilised [59,118]. 
Network Charges 
Transmission network use of system (TNUoS) and distribution use of system (DUoS) 
which recover the cost of providing and maintaining the infrastructure which transports 
electricity across the country are reformed [119]. Currently, these charges are socialised, 
which does not incentivise contracting with a counterparty who is geographically close 
on the network [120]. The specifics of such a reform are outside the scope of this paper, 
but the principle aim would be for these charges to correspond to the distance of the net-
work used in the facilitation of a trade, i.e., requiring the distribution network would incur 
DUoS charges, but not TNUoS. With all participants within a GSP connected to the distri-
bution network, they would be financially stimulated to contract with counterparties 
within their GSP. 
4.4. The DSP  
Modules 1–3 are introduced to facilitate the local balancing and coordinating market. 
Prior to delving into each of these modules, the DSP, and their remit, will be further ex-
plored.  
The DSP is an evolution of the current DNOs operational within GB, combining the 
existing functions of the management of networks with system operations and the role of 
facilitating the local balancing and coordination market [22]. Under their license condi-
tion, the DSP is required to balance their geographical region which is realised through 
the implementation and operation of the DSP pay-as-clear pool market, the DSP ancillary 
and balancing market for each GSP within the DSPs region, which all operate under the 
SPOT timescale (Modules 1–3). 
4.4.1. Module 1: The DSP Pay-As-Clear Pool Module 
This proposed augmentation introduces a pool market settled by an auction based 
upon the pay-as-clear principle. Each of these pay-as-clear pool markets is located at the 
GSP, and as such a single DSP institution may govern several of these pay-as-clear pool 
markets. 
A pool market was selected due to its suitability for VRE generating assets as detailed 
in Table 4—factors which are beneficial to smaller market participants who will likely be 
entering into the DSP pay-as-clear pool market. An auction was selected as the clearing 
mechanism over continuous trading due to favouring smaller market participants. This 
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stems from the standardisation of contracts and the predetermined trading times, which 
in theory should reduce the burden of expertise and constant monitoring of the market 
compared to continuous trading [40,121]. 
Table 4. The rationale for selecting a pool market as opposed to only self-dispatching. Source: 
[20,21,24,40,58,122]. 
Structure Pool 
Suitability for VRE 
Reduced risk of facing imbalance charges as a result of a central 
market which pools liquidity. This promotes the ability for VRE gen-
erators to procure, or sell, depending upon the environmental condi-
tions which may result in deviations from contracted positions.  
Due to standardised products, trades can operate on a faster time-
scale allowing them to occur closer to real time compared to contin-
uous trading. This also allows VRE to react to fluctuations in output 
due to environmental conditions and mitigate imbalance charges.  
Transparency 
Uniform price auction provides transparency and ensures that the 
least expensive and most efficient generating unit or service is dis-
patched. 
Market prices are visible to buyers/traders/sellers. 
Reducing trading 
costs  
Typically lower transaction costs than continuous trading. 
Safe counterparty risk, often provided by the central exchange. 
This market structure is reflective of the distributed locational marginal price 
(DLMP) as proposed by [7,38,123], with each node located at the GSP. The DLMP struc-
ture has been introduced owing to the ability to bring forward the value of location, max-
imise the value received by DER and bring forward investment into both generating and 
demand-side assets at the end of the grid [7,21,31,124,125]. The merits and possible appli-
cations of a DLMP market structure have been modelled by various published works such 
as [7,38,123]. For example, [7], models an organised DLMP market structure for each of 
the nodes within a distribution network as a means to aid in coordinating actions taken 
between the DSO and TSO; [38] models a new local energy market within the distribution 
systems to integrate peer-to-peer (P2P) trading and probabilistic DLMP pricing; [123] 
models a DLMP market structure to alleviate congestion brought forward by the deploy-
ment of EVs, a useful element considering the support of an SES approach within the pro-
posed conceptual framework. Liquidity within the DSP pay-as-clear pool market may be 
a concern due to reducing the geographical network through the DLMP approach, and by 
proxy also reducing the number of market participants. Yet, the adoption of a SES ap-
proach should increase the number of participants within the GSP as many of the electri-
fied technologies, namely heat pumps and EVs, will be connected within a GSP. 
Each of these DSP pay-as-clear pool markets would operate under a two-tier market 
structure. The first tier is for VRE generating assets, whilst the second is for the procure-
ment of flexibility. 
The DAH and ID auctions held by each DSP pay-as-clear pool market would identify 
the forecasted output of VRE generating assets (due to priority and grid dispatch) and 
would compare this to forecasted demand revealed in that auction. Any shortfalls of VRE 
output compared to demand are then met by the flexibility market, which opens post auc-
tion result and is dedicated to the procurement of flexibility from the electricity, heat and 
mobility sectors. If bids into the flexibility market are higher than the clearing price for the 
initial VRE auction, this would raise the overall clearing price within the GSP for that 
settlement period. 
The clearing price for each of the DSP’s pay-as-clear pool markets will differ based 
upon a range of factors including the technologies present within that node, the environ-
mental conditions dictating VRE output, the level of demand needing to be satisfied 
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within each regions and the short run marginal costs of those competing within the flexi-
bility market [126]. Transmission-connected technologies are not permitted to enter into 
the DSP pay-as-clear pool market. However, their services may be indirectly procured if 
the DSP buys a specific service from the wholesale market, or the IISO’s ancillary and 
balancing market. 
4.4.2. Operating within Module 1 
Market participants located within a GSP voluntarily conduct trade into the pay-as-
clear pool or with other participants within their GSP for generation, consumption or flex-
ibility and, in principle, there are no restrictions on whom one may conduct trade with in 
their GSP region (Figure 1). 
These market participants, located on a distribution network within the GSP, can 
conduct trade into this DSP pay-as-clear pool market or through novel means such as P2P 
platforms, LEMs, aggregators and suppliers. This is not an exhaustive list of markets op-
erated by third parties as new and innovative business models may emerge in response 
to the new routes to market for DER. 
This is reflective of a ‘voluntary’ pool structure in which market participants and 
their counterparties can agree bilateral contracts but shall inform the DSP of these to aid 
in scheduling. All forecasted trades are to be known by the DSP who will ensure that 
resulting power flows do not destabilise the grid. 
Relevant data on all trades facilitated within the GSP, either into the DSP pay-as-clear 
pool market or bilaterally between market participants, will be publicly available, with 
confidential data being omitted/anonymised. This practice is evidenced by PicloFlex, a 
third party operated marketplace for the tendering of flexibility within GB facilitates ac-
cess to a wide range of competition and bidding data, detailing the availability and utili-
sation fee, the capacity offered, the time of activation and an indication to where on the 
network the successful assets are located [127]. This transparency will generate substantial 
volumes of data revealing the value received from the performing of a specific action, i.e., 
providing flexibility. Such detailed information would enable a project manager to ana-
lyse whether an investment into a specific technology or provision of service in a certain 
area on the network would lead to a sufficient return on their investment. 
Facilitating end-user services, such as flexibility, may not require time, effort and ex-
pertise as these services can be automated through the combination of artificial intelli-
gence, internet enabled technologies and novel third-party businesses who can provide 
this service whilst extracting value for themselves and the end users [17,128]. 
4.4.3. Module 2: The DSP Ancillary Market 
The deployment of geographically distributed technologies in parallel with IoT pro-
vides the means for these to solve local grid issues such as congestion management, volt-
age control and reactive power to the benefit of both DSP and the IISO [7,11,17,129,130].  
The feasibility is exemplified by existing projects such as UKPN’s Power Potential 
which utilises DER to resolve transmission voltage and thermal constraints through the 
increased coordination between UKPN and National Grid ESO [131–133]. 
The DSP ancillary market would operate transparent auctions held at the DAH and 
ID timescales for specific services for each of their GSPs. This direction is currently in mo-
tion within GB, as evidenced by the a recently reformed product suite by National Grid 
ESO, one of these, Dynamic Containment, being procured at the week ahead, but with 
intention to procure daily [132]. 
At times, it may not be possible to source the required service to solve grid-specific 
issues from within the same GSP that the issue is located. Instead the DSP may need to 
call upon market participants from other GSPs within their region or procure from neigh-
bouring DSPs or the IISO ancillary market, introduced in Section 4.5.  
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Determining when a DSP would instruct a market participant outside of their geo-
graphical remit to aid in the provision of an ancillary service would be based upon an 
algorithm which could factor in aspects such as: 
• Associated carbon, 
• The distance of the technology from load, and 
• Any arising network issues from such a dispatch and the cost of procurement. 
The nuances of such an algorithm are outside the scope of this paper. 
4.4.4. Module 3: The DSP Balancing Market 
In addition to an ancillary market, the DSP will also operate a balancing market for 
each of their GSP regions. Market participants would provide bids and offers to the DSP 
stating the price they would require to either increase or decrease demand/generation. At 
times, it may not be possible to balance a GSP with the technologies located within this 
geographically confined area of the network. Similarly to Module 2, an algorithm would 
also be designed to determine when to instruct a market participant(s) out of their geo-
graphical remit. 
4.5. Module 4: The Wholesale Market  
The wholesale market is operated by a dedicated wholesale market manager, whose 
remit is to ensure transparency in prices by also operating a two tier market structure 
reflective of the DSP pay-as-clear pool market. The standardisation of these two market-
place structures will support the facilitation of distributed technologies, and services lo-
cated within a GSP node into the wholesale market [65,134]. This route to market may be 
utilised if it is believed that there is a higher capture rate for trading into the wholesale 
market rather than their respective DSP pay-as-clear pool market. 
4.6. The IISO 
Modules 5–6 are governed by the IISO, an evolution of National Grid ESO [22]. The 
IISO is an independent and non-profit system operator who would oversee the electricity, 
heat and transport sectors at both the transmission and distribution networks [22,135].  
The specific remit of the IISO in relation to this electricity market design is principally 
to ensure that the entire grid is constantly in balance. The IISO facilitates this through 
operating the reformed IISO ancillary and IISO balancing market (Modules 5–6). The IISO 
will principally be reviewing the transmission-connected generation and demand, whilst 
the DSPs will satisfy the distribution network. With both the IISO and the DSPs licensed 
to provide balancing actions, clear routes of coordination between these two entities are 
required. These are detailed in Section 4.7. 
4.6.1. Module 5: The IISO Ancillary Market  
The IISO would be responsible for national issues on the grid, such as overall grid 
frequency alongside responding to issues on the transmission networks such as con-
straints. The products procured and their entry requirements will be standardised to re-
flect the DSP ancillary markets to aid in the facilitation of market participants from the 
distribution network into this IISO market. 
4.6.2. Module 6: The IISO Balancing Market 
With balancing actions performed by both DSPs and the IISO, there is need to coor-
dinate the actions taken by each institution. This design proposes a two-step gate closure 
to facilitate this. Once the DSP has attempted to balance their geographical region, their 
final physical notification (FPN) is provided to the IISO 5 min before real time. At this 
time, all transmission-connected generation/demand active within this particular settle-
ment period would have also provided their FPN to the IISO. The IISO will then have an 
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overview of the entire distribution and transmission network, allowing them to determine 
the balancing action required. This process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Proposed timeline of events illustrating the two-gate closure process. Authors’ own. 
By providing an overview of the entire network to the IISO, it may indicate how the 
culmination of imbalances from DSP regions, and deviations from the contracted posi-
tions of transmission-connected market participants may in fact ‘net off’, reducing the 
need for balancing actions. This knowledge would not be known by individual DSPs, jus-
tifying the IISO receiving all FPN and implementing any remaining balancing actions. 
4.7. Coordination 
These six modules are interrelated, and the actions taken within one module could 
potentially impact upon another. Therefore, effective coordination between the governing 
institutions—the DSPs, the IISO and the wholesale market manager—is required to miti-
gate conflicting actions being taken [11,39]. 
In relation to market participants from within a GSP entering into one of the national 
markets (Modules 4–6), they would notify their respective DSP of the forecasted trade. 
This would allow the DSP to identify any network issues which may arise such as power 
flow, congestion and voltage deviations, and allow for the cancelation of the forecasted 
trade. 
Furthermore, utilising distributed technologies to solve location-specific network is-
sues will require efficient coordination between the IISO and the respective DSP to ensure 
cost-effective, safe and reliable use of these services [7,11,20,45,76]. There are many pro-
posed models for how resolving network-specific issues would function in reality 
[11,130]. Gerald et al. [11] proposes five coordination schemes to facilitate ancillary ser-
vices between system operators. The DSP ancillary market is based upon the ‘local AS 
market model’, with the DSP procuring ancillary services to satisfy their own network 
before offering any un-used bids to the IISO [11]. 
4.8. Exclusion of the Capacity Market  
As explained in Section 2.2.1, the issues stemming from the capacity market have led 
to this market module being excluded from the proposed design. 
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However, in an electricity system underpinned by variable generation many argue 
for a market mechanism to procure reliability [136–138]. Therefore, this paper recom-
mends the exclusion of the capacity market with an introduction of a reliability option 
scheme instead. 
Reliability options provide an alternative mechanism for those with capacity, be that 
generation or demand, to receive financial payment for the obligation to deliver capacity 
upon being activated by a predetermined signal [50,139,140]. A capacity or demand re-
sponse provider could offer their capacity via a call option in return for an upfront fee to 
those requiring security of supply, i.e., an energy supplier. In this example, the energy 
supplier would be the holder of the call option which provides them the right, but not the 
obligation, to procure the contracted service at a prespecified strike price. Within the pro-
posed design, this could be the clearing price of the DSP pay-as-clear pool market, the 
wholesale market or a third party operated market such as a LEM. Upon the strike price 
stated in the call option being exceeded, the holder of the option is entitled to the differ-
ence between their strike price and the strike price [139,140]. 
This insures the option holder against high market clearing prices, whereas the coun-
terparty providing the capacity or demand response secures an upfront fee for their ser-
vice. This allows risk to be shared between the two parties. The length of the contract can 
be determined between counterparties, with the scope for longer-term arrangements to 
aid in the financing of new capacity [139,140]. There may also be new business models 
stemming from opportunities for third parties such as aggregators who can pool multiple 
smaller capacity providers to meet the requirements of a counterparty. 
4.9. Justification Table  
Table 5, located post conclusion, reviews each of the issues identified in Table 1 and 
how the proposed reconfigurations can aid in mitigating these. 
5. Conclusions 
The electricity market design highly influences the transition pathway of the electric-
ity sector through the determination of the technologies, and services, which can access 
value by defining the products to be procured and the entry requirements to these mar-
ketplaces. The move from a predominantly centralised electricity sector to one which val-
ues distributed technologies and services provides opportunities for new modes of oper-
ation and innovative business models and can aid in the facilitation of net zero. However, 
design of the electricity market has to enable the monetary capture of this value for dis-
tributed market participants to provide an investment case for their deployment. 
The efficacy of GB’s electricity market design is diminishing as a result of the shift 
towards an increasingly variable and decentralised electricity sector. This article has 
demonstrated how the current electricity economics are skewed towards centralised 
forms of technologies, coined the distribution gap. The consequence of excluding DER are 
twofold. First, DER owners are unable to receive the monetary value for the services they 
can provide, they face a higher hurdle rate, constraining future investment and ultimately 
slowing the shift to a net zero electricity system. Second, as centralised technologies do 
receive financial compensation for their services, this aids in the lock in of these often 
carbon-intensive generating assets technologies whilst locking out DER. 
In response to the aforementioned issues with GB’s current electricity market design 
and the benefits which can be unlocked through the exploitation of new opportunities, a 
new electricity market design is proposed. The design, built upon a review of 30 previ-
ously proposed electricity market designs and appraised by industry experts, consists of 
several re-configurations to GB’s current design. First, a local balancing and coordinating 
market is introduced at each GSP. This is achieved through a pay-as-clear pool, balancing 
and ancillary market at each of the GSP nodes, with relevant trade data made publicly 
available. The local balancing and coordinating markets provide a route to market for dis-
Energies 2021, 14, 1124 19 of 28 
 
 
tributed technologies and services provided by the demand side, and in doing so pro-
motes a more efficient use of the network. The transparent nature of these marketplaces 
can help to reveal the value attributed to specific services and technologies, evidencing 
the investment case for DER. Second, the existing wholesale market is reconfigured to 
reflect the GSP market structure to standardise and ease market entrance between the lo-
cal and national level providing further routes to market for distributed market partici-
pants. Table 5 below states how the proposed electricity market design in Section 4 can 
aid in mitigating the issues identified in Table 1. In proposing a holistic re-configuration 
to GB’s electricity market design, the system governance is also reviewed. First, the evo-
lutions of existing governing institutions are introduced to facilitate the smooth operation 
and efficient coordination of this market design. Second, in pursuing a SES approach, the 
design fits into the wider institutional governance by unifying the heat, transport and 
electricity sectors, and therefore plays a pivotal role in the overall energy sector transfor-
mation—an outcome often overlooked when proposing an electricity market design. 
Three areas for further research can be identified. First, mathematical modelling of 
the conceptual framework would aid in the validation of this proposed design and pro-
vide insights beyond the qualitative research presented here. Second, while this research 
has focused on DAH and IDM timescales, further work is needed to consider the impact 
of a highly variable, increasingly decentralised electricity system on the future market. 
Finally, the process of electricity market design evolution is an inherently political process 
with rules enshrined in legislation, codes and regulation. In order to move from the cur-
rent market design to that of the design proposed here, a greater understanding of the 
practicalities of this transition is required.
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Table 5. How the proposed design can aid in mitigating the issues identified within Table 1. Authors’ own. 
Issue Change to Module(s) Explanation for How This Will Aid in Mitigating the Issues Identified Within Table 1 
Missing money 
Coordinated markets 
The introduction of new routes to market(s) can provide additional revenue streams for technologies and 
services which may otherwise find themselves out of merit. 
Nodal (regional in-
vestment signals) 
The clearing price at each GSP nodes shall indicate to investors the potential value streams from the deploy-
ment of a technology, or the provision of a service, in one GSP opposed to another [12,13,126]. Furthermore, 
in reviewing trends over time within the various marketplaces, it may provide investors with insights as to 
when particular DSP pay-as-clear pool markets may be at risk of being oversupplied, which could result in 
specific technologies being out of merit. With this information, they can avoid the deployment of a technol-
ogy or the provision of a service in this marketplace, in favour of another. 
Nodal (constrained 
markets) 
The nodal structure represents multiple constrained markets as opposed to the current signal bidding zone 
in GB. Therefore, a generating or demand-side asset within one GSP will not be competing directly against a 
GSP in another part of the country. As such, a market participant would be directly competing against those 
located within their GSP, which may lessen the depression of the market clearing price depending upon the 
proportion of VRE generation and required load to satisfy. 
Scarcity events (trans-
parency and the exclu-
sion of the capacity 
market) 
The formation of power prices at the local level will reflect regional scarcity and thus the market clearing 
price will allow for transparent scarcity events to emerge [20,73], a solution suggested by [60] to overcome 
the missing money phenomenon. Furthermore, the capacity market has been excluded to reduce the damp-




Similar to missing money. Transparent clearing prices of the bids being accepted/rejected will provide inves-
tors with the data to identify whether a GSP region is close to cannibalising prices at times of high VRE out-
put. 
Flexibility 
The flexibility markets of both Modules 1 and 4 will provide an established route for the procurement of flex-
ible technologies. These technologies, when coupled with VRE, can prevent cannibalisation events through 
storing excess generation during peaks [141,142]. 
Lacking flexibility 
Specific markets for 
flexibility 
The flexibility markets of both Modules 1 and 4 will provide a clear reference price for flexible actions within 
each market module. 
Smart energy system 
approach 
Allowing flexible load from across the energy system to provide flexibility will unlock large flexible capacity 
which could be cheaper than sourcing flexibility from the electricity silo [43,44,101]. 





Freely available bid 
data 
Transparent trade data for bilateral trades alongside the pool market structures shall aid in revealing the 





Trade data are made transparent to aid in revealing the value of specific services. This may reveal the value 
for specific services at different nodes on the network. 
Nodal (geographically 
constrained) 
By excluding transmission-connected technologies from directly competing in the DSP local balancing and 
coordinating market (Modules 1–3), only technologies within that geographical area will be represented in 
the clearing and bid/offer prices of these markets. 
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Nomenclature 
CfD Contract for Difference 
DAH Day Ahead 
DER Distributed Energy Resources 
DLMP Distributed Locational Marginal Price 
DNO Distribution Network Operator 
DSO 
DSP 
Distributed System Operator  
Distributed Service Provider 
DUoS Distribution Use of System 
EVs Electric Vehicles 
FES Future Energy Scenarios 
FPN Final Physical Notification 
GB Great Britain 
GSP Grid Supply Point 
ID Intraday 
IISO Independent Integrated System Operator 
IoT Internet of Things 
LEM Local Energy Markets 
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
ODFM Operation Downward Frequency Management 
OPEX Operational Expenditure 
P2P Peer to Peer 
SES Smart Energy System 
TNUoS Transmission Network Use of System 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
VRE Variable Renewable Energy 
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